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The Semantics Latent in Shannon Information
Alistair M. C. Isaac
Abstract
The lore is that standard information theory provides an analysis of information
quantity, but not of information content. I argue this lore is incorrect, and there is an
adequate informational semantics latent in standard theory. The roots of this notion of
content can be traced to the secret parallel development of an information theory
equivalent to Shannon’s by Turing at Bletchley Park, and it has been suggested
independently in recent work by Skyrms and Bullinaria & Levy. This paper explicitly
articulates the semantics latent in information theory and defends it as an adequate theory
of information content, or natural meaning. I argue that this theory suggests a new
perspective on the classic misrepresentation worry for correlation-based semantics.
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1 Introduction
The locus classicus for information theory is Shannon’s ([1949]) ‘Mathematical Theory of
Communication’. Shannon considered the problem of how much redundancy a
communication channel needs to ensure uncertainty about the signal stays below an
acceptable threshold. In order to analyse this problem, Shannon modelled the source of the
signal as an ergodic Markov process and measured the uncertainty in that process by the
weighted average of the log probabilities of each symbol, or ‘entropy’. This way of
conceptualizing the task of information theory motivated Shannon’s remark that, while such
strings of symbols ‘[f]requently . . . have meaning . . . , [t]hese semantic aspects of
communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem’ (p. 31). Thus, the lore that
Shannon’s theory provides no apparatus for analysing information content was born.
Yet Shannon’s was only one of two parallel endeavours to mathematically analyse
information. A formal apparatus analogous to Shannon’s had already been developed
independently at Bletchley Park by Turing and colleagues in their daily attempts to crack the
Enigma code. While much of the math was the same (in particular, the appeal to log
probabilities as the measure of information, Good [1979]), the goal of Turing’s project was
radically different, namely to infer from an opaque string of symbols its intended meaning
and, more generally, the Enigma machine settings encoding all German messages that day.
Thus, whereas Shannon’s project was unconcerned with meaning per se, Turing’s was focused
on meaning above all else—not the logician’s strict notion of meaning as binary truth
conditions, but rather meaning in the sense of significance, or ‘weight of evidence’, of a signal
in favour of one possible interpretation as opposed to others. More recent work suggests that
this measure of significance may be transformed into a recognizable semantics.
The goal of this paper is to motivate a theory of information content derived entirely from
the standard information theory of Shannon and Turing. This semantics is suitable as an
analysis of the content of natural signs, or the ‘natural meaning’ of Grice ([1957]). Intuitively,
some events convey information about others, and may be interpreted as signs that these other
events obtain; for instance, ‘smoke is a sign of fire’, and thus from observed smoke, we may
safely infer the presence of fire. Grice pointed out that we often speak of this relationship as
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one of meaning—‘those dark clouds mean rain’—yet this natural meaning has different
properties from the non-natural, or conventional, meaning familiar from the study of language.
The question of whether natural meaning is meaning in a strict or merely metaphorical sense is
a vexed one, discussed further in Section 2, which serves to position this project against others
in the literature. In brief, the attitude adopted here is that natural and conventional meaning are
‘species of a common genus’ (Barwise and Perry [1983], p. 16), that the theory of information
content on offer is a probabilistic alternative to, but not competitor with, so-called ‘semantic’
theories of information (e.g. Dretske [1981]; Floridi [2004]), and that it constitutes a true
semantics in the sense that it exhibits the formal features constitutive of any semantic theory.
The basic semantic model is introduced in Section 3; I claim that information content may
be exhaustively represented by a vector of log probability ratios, or ‘s-vector’. The s-vector
encapsulates in a single formal object the complete significance of a signal or
event—intuitively, what it ‘says about the world’—and in this sense constitutes an analysis of
the event’s natural meaning. The remainder of the paper aims to justify s-vector semantics and
elaborate its consequences. Section 4 examines the close connection between meaning and
inference, rehearsing the conceptual argument for s-vector semantics offered by Brian Skyrms
([2010]). Section 5 argues that the work of Bullinaria and Levy ([2007], [2012]) empirically
validates s-vector semantics by demonstrating it outperforms other correlation-based models
of content on semantic tasks. This research suggests a new perspective on the relationship
between natural and conventional meaning in language; in brief: words bear natural meaning
about other words, and, though it is not equivalent to the conventional meaning they bear
about the world, this natural meaning nevertheless determines some of their paradigmatically
semantic features. These considerations lead naturally to the final section of the paper, which
addresses the problem of error for information-based semantics. I argue that (potential)
violations of the ergodicity assumption on which information theory is founded suggest a
novel route toward the naturalization of misrepresentation.
3
2 From Correlation to Meaning
Philosophical theories of meaning typically address two types of question: first, what contents
should be assigned to a set of meaning-bearing elements; second, in virtue of what do these
elements bear the contents they do (Speaks [2016]). The theory offered here assumes an
answer to the second question in order to offer an answer to the first. In particular, Shannon
information is defined in terms of a probability distribution over events, and thus it is in virtue
of patterns in this distribution, in particular statistical correlations, that some events bear
content about others. Such correlation-based semantics face several conceptual challenges,
and this section briefly considers some of the issues at stake, situating the present project with
respect to previous work.
Since at least Dretske ([1981]), philosophers have taken Shannon’s admonition that
‘meaning [is] irrelevant’ in information theory to imply that the mathematics of information
requires a supplementary formal system to serve as its semantics. These ‘semantic’ theories of
information (STIs) borrow methods from logic to characterize information content in a
manner readily identifiable as propositional. One common strategy, for instance, captures the
insight that information reduces uncertainty by treating information content as a set of
possible worlds, and information update as changes to the set of worlds available (e.g. Dretske
[1981]; Floridi [2004]; van Benthem [2011]). A second strategy treats information content as
a gappy proposition, filled in by context or background knowledge (e.g. situation semantics:
Barwise and Perry [1983]; Israel and Perry [1990]). Although they differ in formal specifics,
STIs share commitments that contrast helpfully with the view developed here.
Combined with Grice’s distinction between natural and non-natural meaning, the STI
program motivates a threefold categorization of information. Piccinini and Scarantino
([2011]) helpfully articulate this as a distinction between Shannon (‘non-semantic’), natural
semantic, and non-natural semantic forms of information. The first obtains whenever the
preconditions of Shannon’s theory are met, i.e. a sequence of events or signals may be
modelled by an ergodic Markov process; the second obtains when events are assigned a
meaning by an STI, yet the relationship between these events and those they indicate is
determined by facts about the world, typically causal or lawlike (Dretske [1981]), or robust
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correlations within a circumscribed spatiotemporal domain (Millikan [2004]). Semantic
non-natural information does not depend on nomic or statistical dependance between signal
and signified, but rather on a relationship established by convention, learning, or evolutionary
process (Piccinini and Scarantino [2011], §4.2).
If, however, there is a semantics latent in Shannon’s theory, as argued below, then whenever
Shannon’s preconditions are satisfied, the events or signals that satisfy them are meaningful.
Thus, the distinction between ‘natural semantic’ information and Shannon information is not
best understood as that between meaningful (‘semantic’) and meaningless information, but
rather between information meaningful in one sense (that of STIs), and that meaningful in a
different sense (that of s-vector semantics). This perspective agrees with the taxonomy of
Piccinini and Scarantino, acknowledging three distinct, progressively more semantically
robust types of information, but disagrees with their conclusion that the weakest of these is not
meaningful at all. In support of their conclusion, P&S rightly point out that the set of elements
over which Shannon’s theory is defined need not be semantic in the sense of ‘stand[ing] for
anything’ outside of that set (p. 19). However, if the preconditions of Shannon’s theory are
satisfied, then these elements stand in stable correlation relations with each other, and thus
convey meaning about other elements in the set. This ‘internal’ meaning, meaning in one
signal about other signals, was critical for Turing’s project at Bletchley Park;1 furthermore, it
seems an appropriate notion of meaning for natural signs, which are themselves merely
elements in a set of correlated natural events that convey information about each other.
1Arguably, all three notions of content are important for decoding an Enigma message.
The ultimate target is the conventional meaning of the original German message; in order to
uncover it, however, the observed, coded string of symbols is taken to bear natural (STI)
meaning about the original message (because their relationship is determined by the lawlike
process of Enigma encoding, and thus subject to binary truth conditions). In order to
determine the Enigma settings for the day, however, symbols within the coded message must
be taken as bearing natural (s-vector) meaning about other symbols, as this internal meaning
supports inferences about the underlying correlational structure within the pseudorandom
string (cf. Sections 4 and 5).
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Nevertheless, P&S’s presentation highlights two technical challenges for any attempt to
ground content in correlation; these challenges correspond to two asymmetries in our intuitive
understanding of meaning. First, semantic analysis presupposes an asymmetry between
signifier and signified: aboutness, reference, representation, and other semantic relations are
constitutively directional—‘dog’ refers to furry, tail-wagging quadrupeds, but those
quadrupeds themselves do not likewise refer to ‘dog’. Yet typical measures of correlation (the
Pearson correlation coefficient; mutual information) are symmetrical; if correlation is to serve
as a basis for content, some asymmetrical, directed relationship must be derived from this
apparently symmetrical one. Second, and more generally, we typically assign semantic
content to specialized objects (words, signals, etc.), not to all possible events. Yet correlations
are defined over a homogeneous set of elements, and thus any assignment of content grounded
entirely in correlation would seem to assign contents indiscriminately—not only to events
typically understood as meaningful, but to all events. As discussed below, the theory presented
here exhibits the first asymmetry, between signifier and signified, and may model the second,
between those events that bear meaning and those that do not.
A more subtle issue for theories of natural meaning is the question of ‘factivity’. Grice
argues that it is inconsistent to assert both ‘those clouds mean rain’ and ‘nevertheless, it won’t
rain’.2 More generally, he has been interpreted as demonstrating that, if x naturally means y,
then if x obtains, y must obtain. Others have taken factivity to be a conceptual condition on the
notion of information, i.e. x may only bear the information that y if in fact y (Israel and Perry
[1990]; Floridi [2007]). However, this view is in tension (on the one hand) with the idea that
natural meaning supervenes on correlations, since these are inherently probabilistic, and thus
(apparently) x may bear the (Shannon) information that y is probable, and yet y not in fact
obtain. It is in tension (on the other) with the project that has motivated much discussion of
natural meaning, that of naturalizing meaning tout court. If signals bearing non-natural
meaning may be tokened in error—I may assert ‘McKinley was the twenty-eighth president’
when in fact he was the twenty-fifth—yet naturally meaningful signals may not, then it seems
2As a conclusion about the concept of natural meaning in ordinary language, Grice’s claim
is not unassailable (Hazlett [2010]; Isaac [2010], pp. 132–40).
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that this ‘problem of error’ poses a significant barrier to any attempt to reduce non-natural
meaning to natural meaning.3 The perspective taken here is that natural meaning may
supervene on probabilistic relations without violating factivity; nevertheless, I believe that
s-vector semantics sheds new light on the prospects for a naturalistic account of signal error.
This contentious topic is discussed further in Section 6.
In the face of disagreement about whether vehicles of information are vehicles of meaning,
and whether they may be tokened in error or not, by what lights may I claim that the theory on
offer here should be understood as properly semantic? I take the constitutive feature of a
semantics to be that it assigns a unique, evaluable formal object to each element in a set that
characterizes all and only the content conveyed by that element—intuitively, what it ‘says
about the world’. S-vector semantics provides this for any set of events that satisfies the
formal preconditions for Shannon information, just as the formal semantics developed in logic
and linguistics provide it for paradigmatically meaningful symbol systems. Some (including
many proponents of STIs) have insisted that content must be propositional, but I take this
requirement to be essentially vacuous if it is understood as requiring anything stronger than
that semantic objects be evaluable (as s-vectors are).4 Finally, as elaborated below, the theory
on offer supports solutions to meaning-requiring tasks, such as determination of semantic
3Historically, this problem motivated the shift toward teleological strategies for
naturalizing content (Millikan [1984]; Dretske [1988]), although debate continues about the
extent to which teleosemantics itself relies on patterns of correlation in the environment (Shea
[2007]), provides a satisfactory account of misrepresentation (Fodor [1990]), or, indeed,
addresses the problem of naturalizing semantics at all (Godfrey-Smith [2006]).
4This is because there is no consensus metaphysics of propositions that substantively
constrains the notion of propositional content as more than just conveying a state of the world
(cf. Haugeland’s related discussion of the impotence of possible worlds semantics for
distinguishing between types of content, [1998 [1991]], p. 191). Skyrms ([2010]) asserts that
propositional content is really just a ‘special case of the much richer information-theoretic
account of content’ modelled by s-vector semantics (p. 42); while Birch ([2014]) disputes this
claim, I take it that the real issue in that debate is whether s-vectors are evaluable, and thus
may subvene the possibility of misrepresentation.
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categories in a natural language, or effective inference about the true state of the world. I take
these features to empirically validate s-vector semantics as an analysis of meaning proper.
3 S-Vector Semantics
Shannon’s theory of information presupposes that a sequence of signals or events may be
modelled by an ergodic Markov process; this amounts to the claim that their statistical
behaviour may be captured by a stable joint probability distribution. Given this joint
distribution, we want to assign a unique formal object to each event that characterizes the
information that event conveys (what it ‘tells us about the world’). This section elaborates the
idea that the information conveyed should be identified with the change in information
conditional on the event; in the words of Skyrms, how it ‘moves the probabilit[ies]’ ([2010],
p. 34). The formal object that encapsulates this change in information is the vector of log
probability ratios, which I call an s-vector.5 After motivating the idea that log probability
ratios characterize the information one event carries about another, I introduce the s-vector as
the natural generalization of this idea. The section concludes with some basic features of
s-vector semantics as an analysis of natural meaning, defending the claim that it exhibits the
asymmetry between between signifier and signified we intuitively expect from a theory of
meaning.
Consider a finite probability space 〈Ω,A, P〉, where Ω is a finite set,A is an algebra over Ω,
and P is a probability distribution overA. An algebra is a family of subsets closed under
complement and union, i.e. e ∈ A implies e ⊆ Ω; if e ∈ A, then −e ∈ A (where −e = Ω − e);
and if e1, e2 ∈ A, then e1 ∨ e2 ∈ A (where e1 ∨ e2 = e1 ∪ e2). It follows that e1&e2 = e1 ∩ e2 is
also inA, as e1&e2 = −(−e1 ∨ −e2) ∈ A.
A is interpreted as the set of possible events; −e is the event incompatible with e; and e1&e2
is the event of e1 and e2 occurring together. The probability distribution P characterizes the
correlations between events. To make contact with relevant discussions by Skyrms, Bullinaria
5The ‘s’ in ‘s-vector’ may be taken to stand for ‘Shannon’, on whose theory it is based,
‘Skyrms’, who explicitly defends this version of information semantics, or ‘semantic’, as
Bullinaria and Levy call this same construct a ‘semantic vector’ (Isaac [2010]).
8
and Levy, Good, and Shannon, I’ll typically treat P as a summary of longterm relative
frequencies. In principle, however, the apparatus developed here is compatible with other
philosophical analyses of probability, for instance as propensities or subjective degrees of
belief. Shannon’s theory takes the existence of a joint probability distribution as a
precondition for information, but it is indifferent to the origin or philosophical interpretation
of the underlying probabilities.
Given just the probability measure P, we’d like to characterize the information one event in
A conveys about another. First, however, let’s consider the measure of information quantity in
a single event, call it I; we’d like I(e) to satisfy several intuitive properties.
1. If P(e) = 1, then the quantity of information provided by e is zero, i.e. I(Ω) = 0;
2. All possible events contain positive information, i.e. I(e) ≥ 0 for all e ∈ A;
3. An impossible event conveys infinite information, i.e. P(e) = 0 implies I(e) = ∞.
Furthermore, if events e1 and e2 are statistically independent, then we’d like the information
conveyed by the joint event e1&e2 to simply add up the information conveyed by the two
events separately.
4. The information in independent events sums, i.e. P(e1&e2) = P(e1)P(e2) implies
I(e1&e2) = I(e1) + I(e2).
A function that satisfies these constraints is the negative log of the probability (independent of
choice of base):
I(e) = − log P(e).
This function captures our intuitions that the lower the probability of an event, the more
information it contains; the certain event contains no information; as an event approaches
impossibility, its informational value grows exponentially; and if two unrelated events occur,
we gain the complete information from each of them. It turns out that any decreasing function
of P that satisfies condition 4 will also satisfy conditions 1–3 and be proportional to the
negative log; this result confirms the choice of I as the measure of information in an event
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(Osteyee and Good [1974]). This is the formal notion of information that underlies Shannon’s
entropy measure, which is just the weighted average of the information quantity of each event
in a partition ofA, e.g. for ei ∈ Ω,
H = −
∑
i
P(ei) log P(ei) =
∑
i
P(ei)I(ei).
Now, for any two events e1, e2 ∈ A, what information does e1 convey about e2? We can
reconceive this as a quantitative question: how does e1 change our information about the
possibility of e2? This question was conceived by Turing (as channeled by Good [1950],
[1979]) as the question: how does the ‘evidence’ e1 affect our assessment of the ‘hypothesis’
e2? Turing and Good take this to be the log ratio between the probability of e2 given e1 and the
prior probability of e2. The basic idea is that subtracting the information in e2, given e1, from
the prior information in e2, measures the change in information about e2, i.e. the information
about e2 conveyed by e1:6
I(e1 : e2) = I(e2) − I(e2|e1) = − log P(e2) + log P(e2|e1) = log P(e2|e1)P(e2) .
This definition has the intuitive features we want in a measure of information conveyed by one
event about another:
1. If P(e2|e1) = P(e2), then e1 conveys nothing about e2, and I(e1 : e2) = 0;
2. As P(e2|e1) grows larger than P(e2), e1 conveys more information in favour of e2
occurring, and I(e1 : e2) grows more and more positive;
6Strictly speaking, when presenting this definition, Good conceives of e1 as the hypothesis
and e2 as the evidence; however, the two expressions are equivalent:
P(e2|e1)
P(e2)
=
P(e2|e1)P(e1)
P(e2)P(e1)
=
P(e2&e1)
P(e2)P(e1)
=
P(e1|e2)P(e2)
P(e2)P(e1)
=
P(e1|e2)
P(e1)
.
Here I give the version that conforms with later discussion (cf. Skyrms [2010], p. 35, footnote
4).
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3. As P(e2|e1) shrinks smaller than P(e2), e1 conveys more information against the
occurrence of e2, and I(e1 : e2) grows more and more negative.
Finally, since Shannon’s theory makes no assumptions about the relationship between e1 and
e2 other than the correlation given by the probability distribution P, I characterizes the
complete information about e2 conveyed by e1.
I measures the information content in one event about another, but what is the total
information content of an event? We want a single, unique formal object that captures the
information e conveys about all possible events (everything it ‘says about the world’). One
strategy is simply to collect these separate pieces of information content into a single object
that nevertheless keeps them distinct: for instance, a vector. SinceA is finite, we can index it
by the natural numbers, and use this enumeration to characterize the full content ν of e with
the ‘s-vector’ ν(e):
ν(e) =
〈
log
P(e1|e)
P(e1)
, log
P(e2|e)
P(e2)
, log
P(e3|e)
P(e3)
, . . .
〉
.
ν(e) is the basic semantic object implicit in standard information theory, encapsulating the
total information content of the event e.
The central claim of s-vector semantics is that e means ν(e) (in the natural, informational
sense). At first blush this might seem counterintuitive—a vector of real numbers is simply not
the sort of thing that signals or events might mean. But this is to confuse the formal object
with our interpretation of it (as information semanticists). To compare, STIs identify the
meaning of a signal with a set of ‘worlds’; however, from a formal standpoint, this is just a
mathematical object, a set of arbitrary abstract elements. The semanticist interprets these
elements as possible states of the world. Likewise, while formally an s-vector is just an
ordered array of real numbers, the s-vector semanticist interprets these numbers as changes in
the probabilities of the events e1, e2, e3, etc.
To illustrate the features of s-vector semantics, consider how it handles a typical example of
natural meaning, the claim that smoke is a sign of fire. S-vector semantics presupposes a joint
probability distribution over a set of events including both smoke and fire. At the slot in the
vector ν(smoke) corresponding to log P(fire|smoke)/P(fire), there will be a relatively large
11
number, indicating the dramatically increased probability of fire given smoke over the prior
probability of fire, i.e. that smoke ‘means’ fire. Yet smoke will mean other things as well:
there will also be large values at slots in ν(smoke) corresponding to the events danger and low
visibility. In contrast, events like thunderstorm may correspond to slots with very low negative
numbers, indicating their probability has decreased dramatically. In keeping with the spirit of
an informational semantics, the content of ν(smoke) will depend upon contingent statistical
features of the environment: in a world with constant fire, and only occasional smoke, smoke
will not mean fire.
Unlike a naïve approach to deriving content from correlation, which identifies the content
of one event directly with the (set of) event(s) with which it is (strongly) correlated, s-vector
semantics exhibits the asymmetry we expect from a proper theory of meaning. Events are
bearers of information, but they are not themselves meanings. On this view, it is neither
events, nor even probabilities of events, but changes in the probabilities of events that are
conveyed by (are the content of) a meaningful event. So, while e means ν(e), i.e. a change in
the probability distribution over possible ways the world might be, ν(e) does not ‘mean’ e,
since it is not itself a bearer of meaning, as desired.
The sense in which s-vector semantics is most clearly analogous to our intuitive
understanding of meaning, for instance in natural language, is that it supports a graded
synonymy relation. If e1 and e2 are very close in meaning (‘say’ very similar things about the
state of the world), then ν(e1) and ν(e2) will be geometrically ‘close’ by any plausible measure
of vector distance. Dark clouds and low pressure both mean rain; correspondingly, their
respective s-vectors will fall close together.7 As e1 and e2 approach complete antonymy
(convey maximally incompatible states of the world), their corresponding meanings approach
ν(e1) = −ν(e2).8 Note, however, that antonymy is not the same as negation: e1 = −e2 does not
in general imply that ν(e1) = −ν(e2). The reason for this is that the value of ν(e) depends on
the correlation between e and other possible events; however, the correlation between e1 and ei
may not be inversely, or even systematically, related to the correlation between −e1 and ei. If
7This intuition is confirmed by the results of Bullinaria and Levy, as discussed in Section 5.
8The negation of a vector is equivalent to the negation of each element within it.
Geometrically, −ν(e) points in the opposite direction from ν(e).
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we find out that the die came up two, we learn with certainty it came up even, but if we learn
the die did not come up two, we only learn a little bit about whether it came up even; likewise,
red leaves may mean autumn, but no red leaves may not mean much at all about autumn one
way or another.
This is a particular instance of a more general feature of s-vector semantics that
distinguishes it from typical formal semantics—it is not recursively defined. There is no
general relationship between ν(e1), ν(e2), and ν(e1&e2); this is because the degree of
correlation between e1 and e2 does not systematically determine their respective correlations
with other events, yet these correlations are what determine the relevant s-vectors. This is a
straightforward consequence of taking informational content to be determined by a joint
probability distribution: since we cannot derive P(ei|e1) from P(ei) and P(e1), nor P(e1&e2)
from P(e1) and P(e2), we should not expect to be able to derive ν(e1&e2) from ν(e1) and ν(e2).
Instead, s-vectors must be defined directly in terms of the joint probability distribution, as this
is where the relevant correlations are encoded. If s-vectors are not recursively defined, does
that mean they do not constitute a ‘semantics’? To conclude as such would constitute a kind of
logico-chauvinism, insisting all theories of meaning must conform to one particular style of
formal analysis; such chauvinism would not only rule out s-vector semantics, but also other
heterodox theories of meaning, for instance holism or contextualism.
4 Meaning for Inference
What of the second asymmetry discussed above? We typically only assign meanings to some
events, not all of them. S-vector semantics has the apparatus to model this asymmetry, by
treating the set of events over which the joint probability distribution is defined as sorted into
two subsets (intuitively: ‘signs’ and ‘signifieds’). The motivation for this sorting comes in part
from considerations about how meaningful events or signals are used, namely to support
effective inferences about the world. Acknowledging the role of meaning in supporting
inference also confirms the formal specifics of the s-vector, which semantically mirror a
prominent theory of probabilistic inference, the minimization of Kullback-Leibler divergence.
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Skyrms ([2010]) develops an account of the evolution of signalling systems between simple
agents, proposing the s-vector as a representation of signal content. His view displays the
second semantic asymmetry: signals convey information about other events, but they are not
themselves events of semantic interest, i.e. they are vehicles, but not topics, of
communication. Skyrms takes his analysis of content to be motivated by the use to which
signals are put—receivers use them to predict the state of the world, so the correct theory of
signal content is the one that specifies the exact inferences a signal supports. Furthermore, this
point holds equally for natural signs: we take smoke to be a sign of fire precisely because we
can safely infer the existence of fire from smoke, and an adequate analysis of natural meaning
should explain how it supports such inferences.9
Skyrms’ vector is defined by the log ratio between two probability distributions: the prior
distribution over states of the world, and the posterior distribution over states of the world,
conditional on the signal received. The basic model introduced above may easily be refined to
accommodate this interpretation by treating Ω as sorted into two types of primitive event:
states of the world W and signals S , such that Ω = W ∪ S . Then the content of each si ∈ S is
given by the vector
ν(si) =
〈
log
P(w1|si)
P(w1)
, log
P(w2|si)
P(w2)
, log
P(w3|si)
P(w3)
, . . .
〉
,
for all w j ∈ W.
This sorting of events into two types is also a powerful tool for modelling the content of
natural signs. Prototypical examples of natural signs ‘a means b’ are such that a is
perceptually salient, while b is an event of great importance. For instance, smoke is easy to
spot from a great distance, or by smell as well as sight, while fire is an event of great
importance due to its potential danger and destructive force. Examples like ‘these spots are a
sign of measles’ are even more pronounced: spots are a very easy to see external property,
while measles is completely hidden from our regular sensory apparatus, yet a matter of grave
9The role of natural signs in supporting inferences about the world has been emphasized
recently in the literature on probabilistic theories of information (e.g. Scarantino and Piccinini
[2010], p. 318; Stegmann [2015], §4).
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concern. We could model this asymmetry by splitting the set of correlated natural events into
those that do the natural signing (smoke, spots) and those about which information is conveyed
(fire, measles), in complete analogy with Skyrms.
While it is useful to model this apparent asymmetry in paradigmatic cases of natural
meaning, it is important to emphasize that the semantic homogeneity of the general s-vector
account, which treats every event type as a potential bearer of content, should be considered a
feature, not a bug. The information-theoretic perspective on natural meaning is egalitarian
about information content: ‘The world is full of information’ (Skyrms [2010], p. 44). It is only
when organisms use the information available in nature, by detecting some events with their
perceptual organs, and responding to other events in ways that reflect their importance for
survival, that it makes sense to model correlated events as sorted into signs and signifieds. The
antecedent presence of these correlations, the simple existence of natural signs, however, is the
precondition for this behaviour. The correlations, and thus the information, and thus also the
s-vector content are simply present due to stable facts about the world, independent of any
organism detecting this information and using it.10
Skyrms’ defense of s-vector semantics emphasizes the close formal connection between the
s-vector and Kullback-Leibler divergence, a measure for comparing probability distributions
(p. 42).11 Given the probability measures P and Pe, the KL-divergence of the latter with
respect to the former is given by
10This point is especially vivid once we recognize that parsing the world into signs and
signifieds is both organism and context relative. Many animals use odours as signs for the
presence of food, or of a predator, yet these odours are not perceptually salient events for
humans. Likewise, while typically one is more likely to infer fire from the presence of smoke,
the situation may also be reversed: if fire is visible through the window in a fire-resistant door,
I may take the fire as a sign of smoke, and cover my face with my handkerchief before
opening it (cf. Cummins, et al.’s [2006] notion of ‘unexploited content’).
11Introduced by Kullback and Leibler ([1951]), this measure is sometimes called ‘relative
entropy’ or ‘cross-entropy’, as it generalizes Shannon’s H. Note that D is not
symmetric—D(P1||P2) , D(P2||P1)—so technically not a distance, hence the term
‘divergence’.
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D (Pe||P) =
∑
i
Pe(ei) log
Pe(ei)
P(ei)
.
When Pe(·) = P(·|e), D is just a weighted average over the components of s-vector ν(e); this
averaging erases the particular content conveyed by e in favour of an overall measure of
informational divergence of Pe from P.
Why does Skyrms take the formal continuity between s-vectors and KL-divergence to
support the claim that the s-vector is the right notion of content for Shannon information? I
take it that Skyrms implicitly appeals here to the role of natural meaning in supporting
inference. Minimizing KL-divergence is a prominent proposal for how to infer a new
probability distribution from a prior plus evidence.12 If our intuition is that the content of e is
just what it tells us about the world, then e’s content should be equivalent to whatever we can
legitimately infer about the world from it. If the minimal KL-divergence D(Pe||P) identifies
the optimal information state to infer from e, then it seems to be the right measure for
establishing total content, and the s-vector a legitimate specification of this content, insofar as
it unpacks the separate informational relations KL-divergence averages over into a
semantically interpretable object. On this view, s-vector semantics inherits conceptual support
from any argument that the minimally KL-divergent distribution is exactly what can be
inferred (no more, no less) from a piece of evidence.13
I take it that Skyrms’ considerations provide conceptual support for s-vector semantics.
Insofar as minimizing KL-divergence is the optimal theory of information-based inference,
and the information content of a signal is equivalent to what it tells us about the world
(understood as the inferences it supports), then it appears that the s-vector is the right semantic
object for Shannon information. Nevertheless, if our semantic analysis is a purely theoretical
exercise, then the s-vector is not the only notion of content that might be derived from a joint
12In particular, a more general proposal than simple conditionalization; if P(·|e) is not well
defined, or if e only loosely constrains posterior probability, minimizing D across distributions
that satisfy these constraints determines a unique Pe.
13For explicit arguments to this effect see, for instance, Jaynes ([1957]) or Shore and
Johnson ([1980]); for relevant surveys see Domotor et al. ([1980]) and Csiszár ([2008]).
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probability distribution over events. For instance, Godfrey-Smith ([2012]) explores the
possibility that one might just take the content of an event to be the posterior probability over
states of the world after it occurs, concluding: ‘there is probably no need to choose one view,
saying that such-and-such is the content’ (p. 1292). While I agree with the spirit of
Godfrey-Smith’s remarks, I think there are good reasons to single out the s-vector account
once one considers the practical applications of a theory of information content; in particular,
the s-vector outperforms other representations of content on semantic tasks, the topic of the
next section.
5 Natural Meaning of Conventional Symbols
Skyrms is the first to defend the s-vector as an analysis of content in the philosophical
literature; however, essentially the same theory of content appears earlier in Bullinaria and
Levy ([2007]). B&L participate in a research program that attempts to compute semantic
representations from word co-occurrence statistics, testing the validity of these representations
on semantic tasks. For instance, given a large corpus, can we derive a representation of the
meaning of the word ‘hypothesize’ from just the relative frequencies of words appearing
before (and–or) after it? Can we use this representation to determine whether, say, it is more
similar in meaning to ‘posit’ or ‘subjugate’? It turns out that the representation that performs
best on semantic tasks like this is the s-vector, a result I take to offer a kind of empirical
validation of s-vector semantics.
One might find this result puzzling at first, as words paradigmatically bear conventional
meaning, yet I have explicitly offered s-vector semantics as a theory of natural meaning.
Whenever a set of items stand in stable probability relations, however, they provide natural
meaning about each other that may be characterized by an s-vector. Since words within a
corpus do stand in stable probability relations to each other, they convey natural meaning
about each other in addition to their conventional meaning. What is surprising about the
results discussed here is that the natural meaning words bear about each other in a corpus
turns out to be sufficient to solve some semantic tasks typically conceived of as involving
conventional meaning. This is good news for naturalistic theories of language acquisition, as it
17
shows that basic semantic relationships may be extracted from a set of words by reinforcement
on their correlations. It should be unsurprising to cryptographers, who have relied on the
correlation-based information in some parts of a conventionally meaningful text about other
parts for thousands of years of code making and breaking. Nevertheless, it is important to
emphasize that B&L and their peers do not pretend that the natural meanings of words
extracted from a corpus are equivalent to their full conventional meanings. Rather, they are
only able to extract ‘some aspects of word meaning’ that they posit might ‘form a
computationally efficient foundation for the learning of semantic representations’, perhaps
through supervised learning and more elaborate forms of human interaction ([2007], p. 510).
Since the task of collecting and manipulating word co-occurrence statistics is
computationally demanding, research in this field initially proceeded on the basis of a priori
assumptions about (a) how large or small a contextual window of co-occurring words around
the target to consider; (b) how to represent the results of the collected statistics; and (c) what
measure of distance between these representations captures degree of semantic ‘similarity’.
What distinguished Bullinaria and Levy’s 2007 study at the time was that it treated these as
empirical questions.14 By systematically varying the size of the contextual window that
determined their co-occurrence statistics, the manner in which those statistics were
represented, and the distance metric between representations, they were able to generate a
wide number of different semantic representations, which they then tested on a variety of
semantic tasks, such as semantic categorization, syntactic categorization, and synonymy
questions from the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL). Scoring each
combination of answers to the three questions on these tests allowed them to empirically
determine the optimal semantic representation.
The optimal answer to question (b), the best way to represent co-occurrence statistics for
semantic tasks, is as a vector of positive Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI); PMI simpliciter
14This potted history is based on discussions in the session ‘Lexical Semantics: Bridging
the Gap between Semantic Theory and Computational Simulation’, at which Bullinaria was an
invited speaker, organized by M. Baroni, S. Evert, and A. Lenci at the European Summer
School for Logic, Language, and Information, 4–8 August 2008, Hamburg.
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is exactly the same measure as Good’s I. B&L first determined a measure of co-occurrence
statistics P, were P(w) is just the number of occurrences of the word w divided by the total
number of (token) words in the corpus; the relative frequency of a word w given it appears
within the window of co-occurring contextual words around a target word t, P(w|t), is just the
number of times w appears with t divided by the total number of appearances of t. Then the
PMI ‘semantic vector’ representing the meaning of a target word t with respect to all potential
context words in the corpus, ci, is given by
〈
log
P(c1|t)
P(c1)
, log
P(c2|t)
P(c2)
, log
P(c3|t)
P(c3)
, . . .
〉
,
i.e. identical with ν(t) (pp. 513–4).
Strictly speaking, of all the representations B&L considered, the PMI vector did worst,
while a slight modification of it, the positive PMI vector did best. The positive PMI vector
simply replaces all negative-valued components of a PMI vector with zeros. Essentially, PMI
simpliciter performed poorly on semantic tasks because very large negative components
ensured that some words that should have been judged semantically close were measured as
far apart; in the words of B&L: ‘Negative values indicate less than the expected number of
co-occurrences, which can arise for many reasons, including a poor coverage of the
represented words in the corpus’ (p. 514). I think this result should still be interpreted on
balance as constituting empirical support for the s-vector analysis of information content.
Recall that Shannon’s theory assumes ergodicity in the information source—this means that in
the long term observed statistics will match stable underlying probabilities in the source. The
need for positive PMI here, as B&L acknowledge, is thus due simply to a discrepancy between
the assumption of the ideal theory, that observed frequencies match underlying probabilities,
and the reality of small data sets. In fact, when tested on an even smaller data set than that
initially considered, all B&L’s semantic measures did worse, but the positive PMI
outperformed its competitors by an even greater margin.
I take this result, the empirical success of positive PMI vectors on a variety of semantic
tasks, to provide a kind of pragmatic validation of the claim that s-vector semantics captures
an important notion of information content. Nevertheless, there are significant open questions
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about the exact implications of this research for a theory of natural meaning. The approach of
B&L is that of the engineer—use whatever achieves results for the task at hand—but an
engineering solution does not always conform to our theory-based expectations. In this case,
there is some question about the exact significance of the most effective distance measures
between semantic vectors. B&L found that cosine distance (as opposed to, say, Euclidean or
city block) between positive PMI vectors produced the best results. In contrast,
KL-divergence between probability distributions performed only modestly amongst all
measures considered. One might take this result as a mark against a view such as that
tentatively advanced by Godfrey-Smith ([2012]), that information content be identified with
the posterior probability given the signal, since no distance measure between vectors of
posterior probability (including even KL-divergence) performed as well as s-vectors and
cosine distance. Nevertheless, the result does seem to undermine the elegant theoretical
complementarity between Kullback-Leibler inference and s-vector representation argued in
the previous section. What B&L’s results do show is that an information-based semantics may
solve real-world semantic tasks, and that optimal performance on such tasks requires a theory
very like s-vector semantics.
6 Error and Ergodicity
Do we want a semantics of information on which naturally meaningful events may exhibit
error, i.e. it is possible that a content-bearing event occur, and yet the actual state of the world
not match the content it conveys? As discussed in Section 2, if we accept Grice’s argument
that natural meaning is factive, then it appears we do not. In contrast, if we think that meaning
tout court may be naturalized, then perhaps we do want to allow for the possibility of a
mismatch between content and world (as long as this mismatch may be explained
naturalistically). After a survey of the traditional STI perspective on factivity, error, and
natural meaning, I show that (in contrast to the STI view) it is consistent to maintain that
natural meaning is purely probabilistic, and yet that it is still, in some sense, ‘factive’.
Nevertheless, I conclude by considering some ways in which s-vector content might truly fail
to match the state of the world, and thus exhibit a naturalistic form of error. The most
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interesting of these confronts the possibility that Shannon’s ergodicity assumption fails,
suggesting a new direction for research on the problem of error.
The typical conception of the problem of error for an informational semantics (Dretske
[1981]; Fodor [1984]; Godfrey-Smith [1989]), has focused on the causal, nomic, or etiological
relationship supposedly required for information to pass from one event to another. The
intuition is that one event cannot convey information about another, if that other event does
not in fact occur. Suppose, for instance, that smoke rises from damp, smouldering grass
(e.g. during the sending of smoke signals), but there is in fact no fire—how could such smoke,
then, carry information about fire? If it did bear such information, we could assess the smoke
as misrepresenting the state of the world, and make progress on naturalizing error. However,
since it does not stand in a causal relationship to any fire, it seems it cannot bear information
about fire in the first place. But then the puzzle becomes, how should we distinguish this
instance of smoke, which bears no fire information, from other, fire-information-bearing
instances of smoke?
As a conceptual problem for information-based semantics, this worry has been extensively
discussed for STIs. In general, typical examples of natural signs are not in fact perfectly
correlated with the events they naturally ‘mean’—sometimes there is smoke without fire. STIs
rule out these cases and ensure factivity by stipulating that information is only conveyed
naturally under certain circumstances. For instance, Dretske ([1981]) argues that s may only
bear the information content that w if P(w|s) = 1 for some nomic reason (p. 65). For Dretske,
in a world where it is possible that smouldering grass produce smoke but not fire, smoke
cannot mean fire. Millikan ([2004]) develops a view on which the perfect correlation between
events required to ensure factivity obtains within a gerrymandered spatiotemporal region
(excluding, say, the smouldering grass), and sign-using organisms succeed in using natural
information by ‘tracking’ these regions (Ch. 3). Barwise and Perry ([1983]) appeal to the role
of ‘constraints’ for ensuring factivity of information, in this case the smouldering grass fails
the dryness of tinder constraint on the informational relationship between smoke and fire.
Sign-users become ‘attuned’ to these constraints, i.e. form habits to act as if they are satisfied,
and when environmental constraints change (tinder becomes wet), they may erroneously draw
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inferences on the assumption of information that is not in fact there (pp. 96–100).
S-vector semantics is not subject to the problem of error construed in this way. To begin
with, Shannon does not presuppose that information supervenes on nomic relationships, but
on a stable joint probability distribution over events. Since Shannon’s theory is blind to
whatever underlying causes ensure the stable correlations between events, it does not have the
resources to invoke these causes when characterizing information content. Furthermore,
s-vector semantics does not equate the information content of s directly with some state(s) of
the world w, but rather with a change in the posterior probability of w. Since changes in
probability are not themselves factive with regard to states of the world (the probability of rain
may increase, and yet it not in fact rain), it seems there is no in principle barrier to the factivity
of s-vector semantics. S-vector natural content may be construed as ‘factive’ in the sense that
conveyed changes in probabilities are veridical: if s naturally means the probability of w
increases, and s occurs, then the probability of w has indeed increased, even if w does not
actually occur. A smoke event may be caused by smouldering grass, indicate that the
probability of fire has dramatically increased, and yet still not be in error. This is because the
change in probability the smoke conveys is a fact about the overall statistical co-occurrence of
fire and smoke event types, and the absence of a token instance of fire in the case of this
particular smoke token does not falsify or contradict that overall pattern of correlation. By
treating information as inherently probabilistic, we may avoid the arcane gerrymandering of
Dretske and Millikan, while still maintaining the spirit of factivity. This basic insight has been
extensively defended in the recent literature on probabilistic information (Scarantino and
Piccinini [2010]; Scarantino [2015]; Stegmann [2015]).
Nevertheless, it is also worth considering the possibility that s-vector semantics supports a
limited, naturalistic form of information ‘error’. If it does, then it may suggest a bridge to span
the gap between natural and non-natural forms of meaning, and thereby contribute to an
eventual naturalization of misrepresentation. Skyrms ([2010]) considers the possibility that
signals bearing s-vector meaning may misrepresent the world under circumstances where the
interests of the signalling agent and the receiver are in conflict. For instance, Photuris fireflies
‘deceptively’ send the mating signals of the Photinus genus in order to lure Photinus firefly
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males, which they then eat (p. 75). This example arguably falls between natural and
non-natural meaning—the signalling behaviour of the Photuris is the result of reinforcement
on correlations, and supervenes on nomic patterns in the environment; nevertheless, it conveys
‘misinformation’ in the sense that the meaning-bearing event systematically occurs when its
reinforced correlate for the receiver (the presence of an actual Photinus female) does not.
Since the s-vector content of the signal is derived entirely from the joint probability
distribution over signals and states of the world, however, the signal ‘also increases the
probability of a predator’; Skyrms concludes such ‘deceptive’ signals convey a kind of
‘half-truth’ (pp. 76–7).
While Skyrms describes this example as one of ‘misinformation’, there is a sense in which
the s-vector content of the event continues to veridically match the world, since the changes in
probability it conveys do indeed match the actual correlations in the environment: both a
Photinus female and a predatorial Photuris are more likely to be present when the mating
signal is sent. In order for an event bearing s-vector content to truly ‘misrepresent’ the state of
the world, the change in probabilities it conveys must fail to match the true pattern of
correlations between events. Is such a mismatch possible? We’ve seen a hint at the answer
already in the discussion of Bullinaria and Levy: a signal may misrepresent the world if
Shannon’s assumption of ergodicity is not satisfied—for instance, if the probabilities that
determine its content fail to match the probabilities that obtain when it is tokened.
B&L believed that their attempt to represent content with vectors of pointwise mutual
information was unsuccessful due to a somewhat trivial failure of the ergodicity assumption:
their sample set was too small for observed relative frequencies to match ‘true’ underlying
probabilities. Arguably, this is merely an epistemic problem—it is not that PMI semantic
vectors misrepresent the correlations between words, but rather that B&L were unable to
determine the true PMI semantic vectors. It is possible, however, that the ergodicity
assumption fails for thoroughly metaphysical reasons: underlying probabilities may simply
change over time, and thus the observed system of events may fail to be ergodic. Standard
information theory, and the definition of the s-vector, presuppose that the probabilistic
relations between events are stable. If, conversely, correlations change over time, then the
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static ratio of probabilities ‘meant’ by an event in s-vector semantics may fail to match the
‘true’ probability ratio, and thus that event may ‘misrepresent’ the state of the world when it
occurs.
There is no off-the-shelf metaphysical framework for making sense of standard information
theory, and thus s-vector semantics, in a non-ergodic world. Most metaphysics of information
is in the STI tradition, focusing on nomic, rather than probabilistic, metaphysical issues. The
Skyrms program investigates signal evolution in a probabilistic world, but typically assumes
that world is ergodic. One relevant line of inquiry in this tradition has modelled the
repurposing of learned signals to new aspects of the environment (Barrett [2014]), a problem
arguably analogous to that of tracking changes in observed correlations. In machine learning,
some studies have directly examined strategies for probability matching when causal structure
may change and ergodicity is only local (e.g. Kummerfeld and Danks [2013]). Nevertheless, a
full analysis of this problem, and thus of the problem of error as it applies to s-vector
semantics, remains a project for the future.
7 Conclusion
Contrary to popular lore, there is a theory of meaning latent in standard, Shannon information
theory: s-vector semantics. Since s-vector semantics rests on the same preconditions as
Shannon’s theory, it applies whenever a set of events stand in stable correlations with each
other. A slogan here might be: where there is information, there is information content. This
view contrasts with those that endorse the possibility of ‘non-semantic’ information in name,
but not in spirit. It agrees that there may be true information that does not bear ‘semantic
content’ as defined in the STI tradition, but it claims this information does bear a weak form of
content, the content that signals or events in a correlated set convey about each other. S-vector
semantics is nevertheless a true semantics, both in the intuitive sense that it assigns a unique
semantic object to each event that encapsulates all that it ‘says about the world’, and in the
pragmatic sense that it solves paradigmatically semantic tasks, as demonstrated in the work of
Turing and Good, Bullinaria and Levy, and Skyrms.
S-vector semantics is appropriate as a theory of natural meaning, especially the meaning
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conveyed by natural signs, as this meaning supervenes on stable correlations in the
environment. However, conventional symbols may also bear s-vector content when they stand
in stable correlations with each other, such as words in a corpus. The s-vector, or natural,
meaning borne by conventional symbols is not equivalent to their conventional meaning, it is
content they convey about each other, not about the world. It may be surprising to
philosophers that this s-vector meaning is nevertheless adequate to sort conventional symbols
into semantic and syntactic categories, and to assess relations of synonymy and antonymy, yet
this is a feature of the natural meaning in conventional symbol systems that cryptology has
relied on for its several thousand year history.
Although s-vector content is inherently probabilistic, it may be viewed through a Gricean
lens and interpreted as factive. The insight here is that the change in probabilities conveyed by
a signal may be veridical, even when high probability events do not obtain—smoke may
convey the information that fire is more likely, even when there is no fire. Nevertheless, one
might also wonder if s-vector semantics may subvene a naturalistic account of communication
or representation error. I conjecture that some naturalistic ‘error’, or mismatch between
content and world, might emerge in a situation where probabilities are not in fact stable, but
change with time. Shannon information, s-vector semantics, and probabilistic theories of
inference all typically assume that the world is ergodic, i.e. that underlying probabilities
remain stable and are reflected in observed, long-run frequencies. Developing a metaphysics
for a non-ergodic world, and understanding what information, inference, and natural meaning
might amount to in such a world, is a topic for future research.
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